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ABSTRACT
Data extracted from social networks like Twitter are increas-
ingly being used to build applications and services that mine
and summarize public reactions to events, such as traffic
monitoring platforms, identification of epidemic outbreaks,
and public perception about people and brands. However,
such services are vulnerable to attacks from socialbots− au-
tomated accounts that mimic real users − seeking to tamper
statistics by posting messages generated automatically and
interacting with legitimate users. Potentially, if created in
large scale, socialbots could be used to bias or even inval-
idate many existing services, by infiltrating the social net-
works and acquiring trust of other users with time. This
study aims at understanding infiltration strategies of social-
bots in the Twitter microblogging platform. To this end, we
create 120 socialbot accounts with different characteristics
and strategies (e.g., gender specified in the profile, how ac-
tive they are, the method used to generate their tweets, and
the group of users they interact with), and investigate the
extent to which these bots are able to infiltrate the Twitter
social network. Our results show that even socialbots em-
ploying simple automated mechanisms are able to success-
fully infiltrate the network. Additionally, using a 2k factorial
design, we quantify infiltration effectiveness of different bot
strategies. Our analysis unveils findings that are key for the
design of detection and counter measurements approaches.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become popular
communication platforms where people post messages about
everything, from day-to-day conversations to their opinions
about noteworthy events. The size of the active user bases
and the volume of data created daily on OSNs are massive.
Twitter, a popular micro-blogging site, has more than 200
million active users, who post more than 500 million tweets
a day [30]. Notably, about 90% of the Twitter users make
their content public [6], allowing researchers and companies
to gather and analyze data at scale.
The massive amount of public data offered by Twitter, as-
sociated with its simple and easy-to-use public API, have al-
lowed the emergence of a new wave of applications that ex-
plore real-time Twitter data to offer data mining and knowl-
edge extraction services. Indeed, in the last few years,
there was a dramatic proliferation of applications and stud-
ies that monitor memes, brands, people, products, and note-
worthy events in Twitter, including political elections [36],
stock marketing fluctuations [45], disease epidemic out-
breaks [15], and natural disasters [32].
Although appealing as mechanisms to summarize infor-
mation from the crowds, these services may be vulnerable
to attacks that attempt to tamper their statistics, by dissemi-
nating misinformation in the network [5]. For instance, con-
sider that users of a Twitter-based service might be interested
in knowing what others think about a certain political can-
didate to formulate their own opinion. In this scenario, one
could try to create fake accounts which post tweets to dis-
honestly improve or damage the public perception about this
person, as an attempt to manipulate public opinion. Recent
efforts estimate that more than 20 million Twitter accounts
were fake in 2013 [11] and even Twitter admitted that 5% of
its users are fake [10]. More alarmingly, socialbots – OSN
accounts that are automatically controlled but are made to
look like real users – are already being used to automate this
kind of attack [3, 18, 26].
If socialbots could be created in large numbers, they can
potentially be used to bias public opinion, for example, by
writing large amounts of fake messages and dishonestly im-
prove or damage the public perception about a topic. There
are already evidences of the use of socialbots to create a im-
pression that emerging political movements are popular and
spontaneous [31]. Socialbots have also been used by politi-
cal candidates during election campaigns to try to change the
“trending topics” [28], or to artificially increase their num-
ber of followers [4]. This scenario only gets worse when we
consider the existence of socialbot sale services.1
Despite the large number of applications and services that
rely on Twitter data and the emerging black markets that at-
tempt to manipulate such data [34], there are many unan-
swered questions related to socialbots infiltration in Twit-
1http://www.jetbots.com/
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ter. For instance, Can socialbots really infiltrate Twitter
easily?, What are the characteristics of socialbots that
would enable them to evade current Twitter defenses?,
What strategies could be more effective to gain followers
and influence?, What automatic posting patterns could
be deployed by socialbots without being detected?, and so
on.
To answer these and other questions related to socialbots,
this study attempts to reverse engineer socialbot infiltration
strategies in Twitter. Our methodology consists of creating
120 socialbot accounts with different characteristics and in-
filtration strategies (e.g., gender specified in the profile, how
active they are in interacting with users, the method used to
generate their tweets), and investigating the extent to which
these bots are able to infiltrate the Twitter social network
over the duration of a month. More specifically, we ana-
lyze which socialbot strategy is more successful in acquir-
ing followers and provoking interactions (such as retweets
and mentions) from other Twitter users.2 Then, we perform
a 2k factorial design experiment [20] to quantitatively mea-
sure the extent to which each social strategy affect different
infiltration metrics.
Our findings raise a huge alert about the vulnerability of
many existing Twitter-based services. First, we show that
out of the 120 socialbots we created, only 31% could be de-
tected by Twitter after a period of one month of executing
only automated behavior, suggesting that automated strate-
gies are able to evade Twitter defense mechanisms. Second,
we show that even socialbots employing simple automated
mechanisms successfully acquired hordes of followers and
triggered a large number of interactions from other users,
making several bots to become relatively highly influential
according to metrics like Klout score [22]. Therefore, our
proposed approach to measure which bot strategy works bet-
ter for infiltrating Twitter, may be extremely valuable for
the design of future defense mechanisms. Particularly, we
found that higher Twitter activity (such as following users
and posting messages) showed to be the most important fac-
tor towards successful infiltration when bots target a random
group of users. Other factors, such as the gender and the
profile picture, may gain importance when the attack is con-
centrated on a particular type of users.
As a final contribution, we plan to make our dataset
available to the research community by the time of publi-
cation of this article. The dataset consists of the timeline of
activities and performance of infiltration of each of the 120
socialbots during the 30 days of experimentation. To the
best of our knowledge, this dataset is the first of its kind, and
would allow researchers to explore new aspects of socialbots
infiltration in Twitter.
2Note that our only objective in analyzing the factors that
can enable socialbot infiltration, is to improve defense mech-
anisms in OSNs. We ensured that none of our socialbots
actually posted any malicious content in Twitter. Fur-
thermore, all the socialbot accounts were deleted after one
month of experimentation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion briefly surveys related efforts. In Section 3, we present
the methodology used to create the socialbots. Section 4
presents the metrics used to evaluate the infiltration perfor-
mance of socialbots. Section 5 describes which socialbots
were able to evade Twitter defenses, whereas Section 6 eval-
uates the socialbots configurations that achieve the best infil-
tration performance. Then, Section 7 describes a 2k factorial
design experiment to quantitatively assess the relative impor-
tance of various features in socialbot infiltration strategies.
Finally, Section 8 discusses the implications of our findings
to future defense mechanisms and directions of future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Different forms of spam have been observed in online sys-
tems [19] and OSNs such as Twitter. Specifically, there has
been lot of attention on spam in Twitter, which has been
observed to be much more potent than conventional modes
of spam such as email-spam [16]. In fact, several differ-
ent types of spam activity have been observed in Twitter,
including spamming trending topics [2], polluters [25], link
farming [13], phishing [7], content credibility issues [5], and
automated and fraudulent accounts [34, 45]. Given that the
present study focuses on socialbots in Twitter, the rest of this
section is devoted to review studies related to socialbots.
Bots in OSNs: A particular form of OSN spam con-
sists of the spammers creating socialbots (or simply bots)
which attempt to acquire influence and trust in the OSN be-
fore engaging in malicious activities such as spreading mis-
information and manipulating public opinion. There have
been several attempts towards large-scale creation of bots
in OSNs, such as the Realboy project [9] or the Web Ecol-
ogy project [43]. Messias et al. [26] created bots capable
of interacting with users on Twitter, and achieved signifi-
cant scores according to influence metrics such as Klout and
Twitalyzer.3 Boshmaf et al. [3] designed a social network of
bots in order to conduct a large-scale infiltration; the study
demonstrated that OSNs can be infiltrated with a success rate
of up to 80%. In general, these efforts demonstrate the vul-
nerability of Twitter to the infiltration of bots.
There have also been attempts for detection of bots in
OSNs. Chu et al. [8] used machine learning techniques to
identify three types of accounts on Twitter − users, bots and
cyborgs (users assisted by bots). They showed that the reg-
ularity of posting, the fraction of tweets with URLs and the
posting medium used (e.g., external apps), provide evidence
for the type of the account. Complementary to the detection
of bots, Wagner et al. [41] created a machine learning model
to predict user’s susceptibility to bot attacks using three dif-
ferent set of attributes of the user (network, behavior and
linguistic characteristics). Their results indicate that users
more “open” to social interactions are more susceptible to
attacks. Subsequently, a similar study by Wald et al. [42]
3http://twitalyzer.com
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found that the Klout score, number of followers and friends,
are good predictors of whether a user will interact with bots.
Two perspectives of studying spam: The numer-
ous studies on spam in online forums can be broadly divided
into two classes based on the perspective from which the
study is conducted. A large majority of the studies (includ-
ing the ones stated above) are from the perspective of those
who build spam defense mechanisms, such as developing
classifiers for spammers and bots [8, 25]. However, there
have been a few studies which were conducted from the per-
spective of spammers; these studies essentially attempt to
reverse engineer the strategies of spammers in order to gain
insights which can help to develop better spam defenses.
Most of such studies (from the perspective of spammers)
have been on email spam, and spam in the Web. Pitsillidis
et al. [29] attempted to filter spam emails by exploiting the
perspective of the spammers− they instantiated botnet hosts
in a controlled environment, and monitored spam emails as
they were created, and thus inferred the underlying template
used to generate such emails. Stone-Gross et al. [33] stud-
ied a large-scale botnet from the perspective of the botmas-
ter, and analyzed the methodologies used in orchestrating
spam email campaigns. Gyongyi et al. studied link farms
on the Web, which are groups of interconnected web-pages
which attempt to boost the rankings of particular web-pages.
Specifically, they investigated how multiple web-pages can
be interconnected to optimize rankings [17].
Almost all studies on Twitter spam has focused on under-
standing the dynamics of different forms of spam in Twitter,
or on designing spam defense mechanisms. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no previous study attempting to an-
alyze the strategies of bots/spammers from the perspective
of the spammers themselves. This is the motivation of the
present study − to reverse engineer socialbot strategies in
the Twitter OSN. We believe that this is complementary to
all the aforementioned studies on Twitter spam, can offer a
novel perspective to building more effective defense mecha-
nisms against spam and bot accounts in the future.
3. METHODOLOGY
This study aims to reverse-engineer socialbot strategies in
Twitter, and analyze how various characteristics of the so-
cialbots impact their infiltration performance. For this, it
is necessary to create a set of socialbots in Twitter, which
would attempt to infiltrate the network, and then observe
their behavior and infiltration performance. This section de-
tails the steps followed in this infiltration experiment.
3.1 Creation of socialbots
For the experiments in this study, a set of 120 socialbots
were created on Twitter. The socialbots were implemented
using the open-source Realboy project [9] which is an exper-
imental effort to create ‘believable’ Twitter bots using simple
automated techniques to follow other Twitter users and post
tweets (see [9] for details). Our 120 bots were created over
a period of 20 days, using 12 distinct IP addresses (10 bots
were operated from each IP address). Subsequently, starting
from 10 days after the creation of the last bot, we monitored
their behavior and their interactions with other Twitter users
over a period of 30 days.
Profile settings of socialbots: To make bot accounts
look similar to real users in Twitter, we took the following
steps while creating the bot accounts. Each socialbot has a
customized profile, which includes a name, a biography, a
profile picture, and a background. The gender of the bot is
also set to ‘male’ or ‘female’ using a proper name and profile
picture. Further, to ensure that when other Twitter users see
our bot accounts, they do not see a totally ‘empty’ profile,
the socialbots are initially set to have a few followers, fol-
lowings and tweets. As detailed later in this section, the 120
socialbots are divided into groups based on the set of target
users they are assigned to follow. Each bot initially follows
a small number (randomly selected between one and seven)
of the most popular users among the target users assigned to
it. Also, all socialbots assigned to the same target-set follow
each other, so that every bot account has some followers to
start with. Finally, every socialbot posted 10 tweets before
attempting to interact with other users.
Activity settings of socialbots: Since the objective of
our socialbots is to infiltrate the social network, it is neces-
sary that they interact with other users in the social network.
For this, our socialbots can perform a set of basic actions:
(i) post tweets, (ii) retweet tweets posted by the users they
follow, and (iii) follow users on Twitter.
Specifically, a socialbot becomes ‘active’ at pre-defined
instants of time; the gap between two such instants of ac-
tivity is chosen randomly (as detailed later in this section).
Once a socialbot becomes active, it performs the following
two actions – (i) with equal probability, the socialbot either
posts a new tweet, or retweets a tweet that it has received
from its followings, and (ii) the socialbot follows a random
number (between 1 and 5) of the target users assigned to it,
and follows some of the users who have followed it (if any)
since the last instant of activity.
Note that we attempt to ensure that our bots do not link to
spammers or other fake accounts, which could make Twit-
ter’s spam defense mechanisms suspicious, and potentially
lead to suspension of the bot accounts. For this, our bots
only follow users from their respective target-set, and some
selected users from among those who have followed them.
Since it is known that spammers in Twitter usually have
far less number of followers than the number of follow-
ings [2, 25], our socialbots follow back non-targeted users
only if those users have their number of followers greater
than half the number of their followings.
3.2 Attributes of the socialbots
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There are a number of attributes of a Twitter user-account
which could potentially influence how it is viewed by other
users. Since analyzing the impact of all possible attributes
involves a high cost, we decided to focus on the following
four specific attributes of the socialbot accounts: (i) the gen-
der mentioned in the bot’s profile, (ii) the activity level, i.e.,
how active the bot is in following users and posting tweets,
(iii) the strategy used by the socialbot to generate tweets, and
(iv) the target set of users whom the socialbot links with.
We set the socialbot accounts such that they have diverse
characteristics with respect to each of the four attributes
stated above, and then attempt to measure whether any of
these attributes can make a bot more successful in terms of
infiltration. The rest of this section describes these attributes,
and their distribution in the 120 socialbots created.
3.2.1 Gender
Out of the 120 socialbots created for our experiments, half
are specified to be male, while the other half are specified to
be female. Setting the gender of a socialbot involves using
an appropriate name and profile picture.
3.2.2 Activity level
Here we aim at investigating whether more active bots
are more likely to be successful in infiltration tasks, than
less active ones. Note that while more active bots are more
likely to be visible to other users, they are also more likely
to be detected by Twitter defense mechanisms; hence there
is a trade-off in deciding the activity level of socialbots.
For simplicity, we create socialbots with only two levels
of activity, based on the interval between two consecutive
instants when a bot becomes ‘active’ and engages in follow-
ing users and posting tweets (as stated earlier in Section 3.1):
(1) High activity: For these socialbots, the intervals
between two consecutive instances of activity are chosen
randomly between 1 and 60 minutes.
(2) Low activity: For these socialbots, the intervals
between two consecutive instances of activity are chosen
randomly between 1 and 120 minutes.
Half of our 120 socialbots are configured with high activ-
ity, while the other 60 are configured with low activity. Also,
all socialbots ‘sleep’ between 22:00 and 09:00 Pacific time
zone, simulating the expected downtime of human users.
3.2.3 Tweet generating strategy
Making a socialbot to look like a legitimate user requires
automated methodologies for generating well-written
tweets with relevant content. We employ two different
methodologies for generating tweets from our bot accounts:
(1) Re-posting: As the name indicates, this method con-
sists of re-posting tweets that were originally posted by an-
other user, as if they were one’s own. A socialbot employing
I
don’t snails
turtleslike
rabbits
start 0.66
1.0
0.33
0.33
0.33
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Figure 1: Example of a bigram Markov chain – to demon-
strate the approach used to synthetically generate tweets
posted by the socialbots.
this strategy simply re-posts tweets (written by other Twitter
users) drawn from the random sample of the Twitter stream.4
Note that a very large fraction of posts in Twitter are day-
to-day conversation [14, 40]. Hence blindly re-posting any
random tweet may result in posting mostly conversational
tweets, which would not seem interesting to the target users
(whom the bot intends to interact with). Thus, we adopted
the following approach to increase the odds that the tweets
re-posted by our bots have content relevant to the target
users. For a particular bot, we extracted the top 20 terms
that are most frequently used by the target users of that bot
(after ignoring a common set of English stop-words). Sub-
sequently, a bot considers a tweet for re-posting only if it
contains at least one of these top 20 terms.
(2) Generating synthetic tweets: This approach syn-
thetically generates tweets that are likely to be as relevant
as the tweets posted by the target users. Our approach uses
a Markov generator [1, 21] − a mathematical model used
to generate text that looks similar to the text contained in a
sample set of documents. Figure 1 shows an example of a
bigram Markov generator, extracted from the sample set of
documents {“I like turtles”, “I like rabbits” and “I don’t like
snails”}. Here, the weight of an edge wi → wj denotes the
probability that the word wj immediately follows word wi,
as measured from the sample documents.5 A possible text
generated by the Markov generator in Figure 1 is “I don’t
like rabbits” (see [1, 21] for details of the method).
To increase the likelihood that the tweets generated by a
socialbot are considered relevant by the target users, we use
a set of tweets recently posted by the target users of that so-
cialbot, as the sample set to create the Markov generator.
Specifically, we use a trigram Markov generator, since tri-
grams showed the best results when compared to n-grams of
another order. We initially extract the empirical probability
4Twitter provides a 1% random sample of the complete
tweet stream for public use.
5For instance, there is an edge of weight 2
3
between the
nodes “I” and “like” since, out of the three occurrences of
the word “I” in the sample documents, two occurrences are
immediately followed by the word “like”.
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I don’t have an error in it :)
The amount of content being published this week :: the
number of people who’ve finished this website but it makes
it easier to argue that
Why isn’t go in the morning! night y’all
Night y’all ???!
take me to fernandos and you’ll see
end aids now, the marilyn chambers memorial film festival
I’d fix health care continues to outpace much of nation’s
issues move to the
Table 1: Examples of tweets synthetically generated by
the Markov generator
of occurrence of each trigram in the sample set, then gener-
ate a Markov generator from the obtained set of trigrams.
The main advantages of this method are that it does not
require any human effort, but it generates text containing the
representative terms of the sample set of documents. Thus,
with a relatively high probability, the tweets generated by
the socialbots are on the topics of interest of the target group.
However, the textual quality of the tweets may be low, e.g.,
some tweets may be unfinished sentences. Moreover,
because of the way that the method has been implemented
it is unable to generate tweets containing user-mentions or
URLs. Table 1 shows some example tweets generated by
the Markov generator used in our experiment.
Half of our 120 socialbots use only the reposting method,
while the others utilize both the above methods, where each
method has an equal probability to generate the next tweet.
3.2.4 Target users
Another factor which potentially affects the performance
of socialbots in infiltration tasks is the set of target users, i.e.,
the set of users with whom the socialbot attempts to interact
and infiltrate. For instance, we wanted to check whether it
is easier for socialbots to infiltrate randomly selected users,
or users who are similar to each other in some way (e.g.,
users who are interested in a common topic, or users who
are socially connected among themselves).
As stated earlier, we wished to ensure that our socialbots
do not link to spammers or other fake accounts in Twitter.
Hence, we consider as a potential target user, only those
user-accounts which possess the following characteristics:
(i) are controlled by a human (as manually judged from
the account’s profile and the nature of the tweets posted),
(ii) post tweets in English, to ensure that they understand
the language used by our bots and, (iii) are active, i.e.,
has posted at least one tweet since December 2013. We
considered the following three groups of target users:
Group 1: Consisting of 200 users randomly selected from
the Twitter stream random sample, and verified that they
meet the above mentioned criteria.
Group 2: Consisting of 200 users who post tweets on a
specific topic. We decided to focus on a group of software
developers; hence, we selected users from the Twitter ran-
dom sample, who have posted at least one tweet containing
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Figure 2: Comparing the three groups of target users:
CDFs for (i) age of the user-accounts, (ii) number of
tweets posted by the users, (iii) number of followers, and
(iv) Klout Score of the users in the three groups.
any of the terms “jQuery”, “javascript” or “nodejs”. Sub-
sequently, we randomly selected 200 accounts from among
these users, after verifying that they meet the criteria stated
above. Note that though we focus on software developers,
the study could be conducted on groups of users interested
in any arbitrary topic.
Group 3: Consisting of 200 users who post tweets on
a specific topic, and are socially connected among them-
selves. As the topic, we again focus on software developers.
Here we started with a ‘seed user’ – @jeresig, who is an
influential software developer on Twitter, and creator of
‘jQuery’ – and collected the 1-hop neighborhood of the
seed user. From among these users, we extracted 200 users
whose profiles show that they are software developers, who
satisfy the criteria stated above, and whose social links form
a dense sub-graph in the Twitter social network.
Out of the 120 socialbots, 40 were assigned to each group
of target users. To bring out the differences among the three
groups (selected as described above), we conducted a brief
characterization of each group. Figure 2 shows distribu-
tions of the users in the three target groups according to:
(i) the age of their accounts, (ii) the total number of tweets
posted during their life-time, (iii) their number of followers,
and (iv) their Klout scores. We found that users in group 1
have relatively newer accounts than the other groups (Fig-
ure 2(a)); however, they are more active in posting tweets
(Figure 2(b)). Further, users in group 3 are more influential
than the other groups, i.e., have a greater number of follow-
ers (Figure 2(c)) and higher Klout scores (Figure 2(d)).
The justification behind our choices of target users is as
follows. First, we intend to check whether it is easier for so-
cialbots to interact with and infiltrate heterogeneous groups
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of users (Group 1), or a particular category of users based
on common interests (e.g., software developers, as in Group
2 and Group 3). Second, we wanted to compare the rela-
tive difficulty in infiltrating a group of users who are socially
well-connected among themselves, versus users who are not
socially connected. For this, we select Group 2 and Group
3 as stated above, so that both groups of users are interested
in the same topic, but Group 3 is densely connected in the
social network while Group 2 is not.
Thus, the 120 socialbots created for this experiment were
configured with different strategies for the four chosen at-
tributes. The subsequent sections will analyze which of
these strategies result in better infiltration performance.
4. MEASURING INFILTRATION PER-
FORMANCE
The objective of this study is to investigate whether,
and to what extent, various socialbot strategies are able to
infiltrate the Twitter social network. Naturally, we need
some metrics to quantify the infiltration performance of
socialbots, so that the performance of different strategies
(employed by the socialbots) can be compared. To quantify
infiltration performance we use the following three metrics,
measured at the end of the duration of the experiment.
(1) Followers acquired by the socialbot: We count
the number of followers acquired by the socialbot, which is
a standard metric for estimating the popularity / influence of
users in the Twitter social network [6].
(2) Klout score acquired by the socialbot: Klout
score [22] is a popular metric for the online social influence
of a user. Though the exact algorithm for the metric is not
known publicly, the Klout score for a given user is known to
consider various data points from Twitter (and other OSNs,
if available), such as the number of followers and followings
of the user, retweets, membership of the user in Lists, how
many spam / dead accounts are following the user, how in-
fluential are the people who retweet / mention the user, and
so on [23]. Klout scores range from 1 to 100, with higher
scores implying a higher online social influence of a user.
(3) Message-based interactions with other users:
We measure the number of times other users interact with
a socialbot through messages (tweets) posted in the social
network. Considering the different types of message-based
interactions allowed in Twitter, we specifically count the to-
tal number of times some user @mentions the bot, or replies
to the bot, or retweets / favorites a tweet posted by the bot.
This metric estimates the social engagement of the bot,
which is defined as the extent to which a user participates in
a broad range of social roles and relationships [44].
If a bot scores well in terms of the above metrics, it implies
that the tweets posted by this bot are more likely to be visi-
ble, e.g., more likely to be included in Twitter search results,
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Figure 3: Distribution of attributes of the 120 socialbots
created for the infiltration experiment, showing those so-
cialbots which were detected and suspended by Twitter
during the experiment (shown in red color). Note that
69% of the socialbots (shown in blue color) could not be
detected by Twitter.
and is hence more likely to affect the opinion of other users
(which are common goals of bots in social networks).
The subsequent sections measure the success of various
socialbot strategies in infiltrating the social network accord-
ing to the metrics specified above.
5. CAN SOCIALBOTS INFILTRATE TWIT-
TER?
We first investigate whether, and to what extent, social-
bots can infiltrate the Twitter social network. For a social-
bot to successfully infiltrate the network, it needs to achieve
the following two objectives. (i) evade detection by Twit-
ter’s spam defense mechanisms which regularly check for
and suspend accounts exhibiting automated activities [38],
and (ii) acquire a substantial level of popularity and influ-
ence in the social network, and interact with large number of
other users, i.e., achieve high scores in the metrics described
in Section 4
In this section, we investigate how socialbots performed with
respect to the above objectives.
5.1 Socialbots can evade Twitter defenses
We start by checking how many of the 120 socialbots
could be detected by Twitter. We find that over the 30 days
during which the experiment was carried out, 38 out of the
120 socialbots were suspended. This implies that although
all our socialbots actively posted tweets and followed other
users during this period, as many as 69% of the socialbots
could not be detected by Twitter spam defense mechanisms.
We next analyze which of the 120 socialbots could be de-
tected by Twitter. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the four
attributes – gender, level of activity, tweeting methodology,
and target group of users followed – among the 120 social-
bots created. The socialbots are indicated by numeric identi-
fiers in the same order in which they were created, i.e., Bot1
was created first and Bot120 was the last socialbot created.
The socialbots which were suspended by Twitter during the
experiment (one month) are indicated in red color, while the
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socialbots which could not be detected by Twitter are shown
in blue color.
We note that a large majority of the socialbots which
were suspended were the ones which were created at the
end of the account creation process (with ids between 90
and 120). This is probably because by the time these ac-
counts were created, Twitter’s defense mechanisms had be-
come suspicious of several accounts being created from the
same block of IP addresses.6 We also find that the socialbots
which used the Markov-based posting method were more
likely to be suspended. This is expected, since about half
of the tweets posted by these accounts were synthetically
generated, and hence likely to be of low textual quality.
However, the Twitter defense mechanisms could detect
only a small fraction of the socialbots which were created
early, and which adopted the re-posting strategy, i.e., re-
posted others’ tweets. These statistics highlight that exist-
ing defense mechanisms are of only limited use in detecting
socialbots which employ simple but intelligent strategies for
posting tweets and linking to other users. Further, the rela-
tively low fraction of suspended accounts justifies our strate-
gies such as re-posting others’ tweets, and ensuring that our
socialbots do not link with large number of spammers and
fake accounts (as described in Section 3).
5.2 Bots can infiltrate Twitter successfully
We next check to what extent socialbots can infiltrate the
Twitter social network, and whether they can gain relatively
high scores according to the metrics stated in Section 4.
Over the duration of the experiment, the 120 socialbots
created by us received in total 4,999 follows from 1,952 dis-
tinct users, and 2,128 message-based interactions from 1,187
distinct users. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number
of followers, the Klout score and the number of message-
based interactions acquired by the socialbots at the end of
the experiment. It is evident that a significant fraction of the
socialbots acquire relatively high popularity and influence
scores. Within just one month (the duration of the experi-
ment), more than 20% of the socialbots acquired more than
100 followers (Figure 4(a)); it can be noted that 46% of the
users in Twitter have less than 100 followers [37]. Further-
more, Figure 4(b) shows that 20% of the socialbots acquired
Klout scores higher than 35 within only one month.
Table 2 compares the Klout scores acquired by the three
socialbots that acquired the highest Klout scores7 with some
real and active Twitter users – members of the COSN com-
munity. We find that the socialbots achieved Klout scores
of the same order of (or, at times, even higher than) sev-
6As stated in Section 3, we used 12 distinct IP addresses
to create the 120 socialbots, i.e., 10 accounts were operated
from each IP address.
7The three socialbots which acquired the highest Klout
scores have common characteristics – all of them had their
gender specified as ‘female’, were highly active, used only
reposting as the mechanism for posting tweets, and followed
Group 2 of target users (see Section 3).
eral of these well-known academicians and social network
researchers. Additionally, these socialbots also acquired
higher Klout scores than the two bots developed in the prior
study [26].
Note that the Klout scores of our socialbots were ac-
quired over only one month (the duration of the experiment),
whereas the real users in Table 2 have accumulated influ-
ence over several years. Besides, most of the real users
in Table 2 have accounts in multiple OSNs (e.g., Twitter,
Facebook, LinkedIn), all of which contribute towards their
Klout scores; on the other hand, the Klout scores of our so-
cialbots are only contributed by their Twitter accounts. In
spite of the above limitations, the scores of our socialbots
highlight the fact that bots employing relatively simple auto-
mated strategies to follow users and post tweets, can achieve
significantly high levels of popularity and social engagement
in Twitter network.
User Description Klout
Carlos Castillo COSN’14 TPC member 56
Ben Zhao COSN’14 TPC member 52
Ashish Goel COSN’14 TPC member 46
Francesco Bonchi COSN’14 TPC member 44
Winter Mason COSN’14 TPC member 44
PK COSN’14 Publicity Chair 43
Mirco Musolesi COSN’14 TPC member 43
Bot 28 Socialbot in this study 42
Bot 4 Socialbot in this study 39
Bot 16 Socialbot in this study 39
Christo Wilson COSN’14 Budget Chair 38
scarina Bot developed in [26] 37.5
Fabricio Benevenuto COSN’14 TPC member 27
Paolo Boldi COSN’14 TPC member 19
fepessoinha Bot developed in [26] 12.3
Table 2: Comparison of Klout scores of some of our so-
cialbots with members of the COSN community, and
bots developed in the prior study [26].
6. EVALUATING INFILTRATION STRA-
TEGIES
The previous section showed that a significant fraction of
the socialbots are indeed able to infiltrate and gain popularity
in the Twitter social network. This section analyzes which
socialbot strategies lead to better infiltration performance.
Recall from Section 3 that the socialbots were configured
with multiple strategies for each of the four attributes – gen-
der, activity level, tweet-posting method, and type of target
users. We now investigate which strategies for each of the
four attributes yields the best infiltration performance. Note
that the results stated in this section (and the next) consider
those socialbots which were not suspended by Twitter during
the experiment (as described in Section 5).
6.1 Gender
We start by analyzing the impact of the gender of the so-
cialbots in our experiments. Figure 5(a) and (b) respectively
show the mean number of followers and the Klout score ac-
quired by the male and female socialbots over each day dur-
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Figure 4: Infiltration performance of our socialbots: CDFs for (i) number of followers, (ii) Klout Score, and (iii)
number of message-based interactions with other users.
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Figure 5: Infiltration performance of socialbots of different genders through the duration of the experiment: (i) mean
number of followers acquired, (ii) mean Klout score acquired, and (iii) mean number of message-based interactions
with other users. The curves represent the mean values, which the error bars indicated the 95% confidence intervals.
ing our experiment. In these figures, the curves represent
the mean values considering all the socialbots of a particu-
lar gender (on a given day during the experiment), and the
error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the mean
values. We find that there is no significant difference in the
popularity acquired by socialbots of different genders.
We next turn to the message-based interactions of the male
and female socialbots with other users. Figure 5(c) shows
the mean number of interactions of the socialbots on each
day during the experiment. Again, we observe that users
interacted almost equally with socialbots of both genders.8
The above results imply that the gender specified in the
account profile does not significantly influence the infiltra-
tion performance of the socialbots. It can be noted that, in
this section, we are considering all the socialbots (and in-
teractions with all target users) together. Later in Section 7,
when we separately analyze the performance of socialbots in
infiltrating each group of target users, we shall see that the
gender attribute is indeed significant for some specific target
groups.
6.2 Activity Level
We next study the impact of the socialbots’ activity levels,
which we define as lower or higher based on how frequently
a socialbot posts tweets and follows users.
8The number of distinct users who interacted with the fe-
male socialbots (1,697), was, in fact, slightly higher than
the number who interacted with the male socialbots (1,528).
But, as evident from Figure 5(c), this difference is not a sig-
nificant one.
Figure 6(a) and (b) respectively show the mean number of
followers and mean Klout scores of the socialbots (having
the two different levels of activity) on each day during the
experiment. We can see that socialbots with higher activity
levels achieve significantly more popularity and Klout score
than less active socialbots. Figure 6(c) show the mean num-
ber of message-based interactions of socialbots with other
users in Twitter. Again, the more active socialbots achieved
much more interactions.
Thus, we find that the more active are the bots, the more
likely they are to be successful in infiltration tasks, as well as
in gaining popularity in the social network. This is expected,
since the more active a bot is, the higher is the likelihood of
its being visible to other users. However, it must also be
noted that the more active a bot is, the more likely it is to be
detected by Twitter’s defense mechanisms.
6.3 Tweet generating method
We next analyze the impact of the tweet generating
method used by the socialbots. Recall from Section 3 that
half of our socialbots only re-posted tweets written by other
users (strategy denoted as ‘reposting’), while the other half
re-posted tweets as well as synthetically generated tweets
using a Markov generator, with equal probability (strategy
denoted as ‘reposting + Markov’).
Figure 7(a), (b), and (c) respectively show the mean num-
ber of followers, mean Klout scores, and the mean number of
message-based interactions acquired by the socialbots em-
ploying the two posting strategies (on each day during the
experiment). It is seen that the socialbots employing the ‘re-
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Figure 6: Infiltration performance of socialbots having different activity levels: (i) mean number of followers, (ii) mean
Klout score, and (iii) mean number of message-based interactions with other users.
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Figure 7: Infiltration performance of socialbots employing different methodologies to generate tweets: (i) mean number
of followers acquired, (ii) mean Klout score, and (iii) mean number of message-based interactions with other users.
posting + Markov’ strategy acquired marginally higher lev-
els of popularity (number of followers and Klout scores),
and much higher amount of interactions (social engagement)
with other users.
The fact that socialbots which automatically generated
about half of their tweets achieved higher social engagement
is surprising, since it indicates that users in Twitter are not
able to distinguish between (accounts which post) human-
generated tweets and automatically generated tweets using
simple statistical models. This is possibly because a large
fraction of tweets in Twitter are written in an informal, gram-
matically incoherent style [24], so that even simple statisti-
cal models can produce tweets with quality similar to those
posted by humans in Twitter.
6.4 Target users
Finally, we analyze the infiltration performance of social-
bots who were assigned different sets of target-users to fol-
low. Recall from Section 3 that the socialbots were divided
into three groups based on the target-set – Group 1 followed
users selected at random, Group 2 followed target-users who
post tweets on a specific topic (related to software develop-
ment), and Group 3 of socialbots followed target-users who
not only post tweets on the specific topic but are also socially
well-connected among themselves.
Figure 8(a) shows the average number of followers ac-
quired by each group of socialbots throughout the experi-
ment. It is seen that the socialbots in Group 3 had the low-
est number of followers, while those in Group 2 had a sig-
nificantly higher number of followers. Figure 8(b) shows
the average values of Klout score achieved by our socialbots
over time. Again, the socialbots in Group 2 have the highest
Klout scores, while the other groups have a similar perfor-
mance. Figure 8(c) shows the average number of message-
based interactions of each group of socialbots (with other
Twitter users) over time. Again, we find that socialbots in
Group 2 got significantly more interactions with other users,
and those in Group 3 got the least interactions.
These observations lead to some interesting insights. Fol-
lowing a set of users who post tweets on a specific com-
mon topic (e.g., software development) is a more promising
approach than following random users (as done by Group
1). However, although the target-users for both Group 2
and Group 3 post tweets on a common topic, the social-
bots in Group 2 achieved significantly higher popularity
and engagement – this implies that infiltrating into inter-
connected groups of users (Group 3) is far more difficult
than engaging with users without any relation among them-
selves (Group 2). Note that this observations differs from
those made by similar research on Facebook [12]. where
it was found that socialbots can effectively infiltrate social
networks among members of specific organizations.
Summary: The analysis of the impact of various attributes
on the infiltration performance of socialbots shows that,
while certain attributes – such as the gender mentioned in the
profile – do not significantly affect infiltration performance,
other attributes such as the activity level and the choice of the
target users has large impact upon infiltration performance.
In this section, we focused on each attribute individually, and
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Figure 8: Infiltration performance of socialbots which followed different sets of target users: (i) mean umber of followers
acquired, (ii) mean Klout score, and (iii) mean number of message-based interactions with other users.
compared the infiltration performance for different choices
(strategies) of that attribute. However, we did not attempt
to analyze the relative importance of different attributes;
for instance, we did not investigate which of the two at-
tributes (i) activity level and (ii) choice of target users has
the larger impact upon infiltration performance. The next
section quantifies the relative impact of the various attributes
on infiltration performances.
7. ASSESSING ATTRIBUTE IMPOR-
TANCE
In this section, we aim to assess the relative importance
of the different attributes and infiltration strategies of the so-
cialbots. Our objective is to quantify which strategy (or,
combination of strategies) has the greatest impact in decid-
ing how the socialbots can infiltrate specific groups of target
users. Note that, differently from Section 6, here we consider
the socialbots’ performance in infiltrating specific groups of
targeted users.
We present a factorial design experiment to assess the
relative impact of the different infiltration strategies. We be-
gin by briefly describing how we designed our experiments,
and then discuss the obtained results.
7.1 2k factorial experiment
We here include a brief description of the theory of 2k
factorial experiments; we refer the reader to [20] for a com-
prehensive description.
An experimental design strategy is usually necessary in
scenarios with a large number of factors, as an attempt to
reduce the number of factors that will be part of the experi-
ment. Particularly, 2k designs refer to experimental designs
with k factors where each factor has the minimal number
of levels, just two. As an illustrative example, suppose an
experimental performance scenario in which three factors –
memory, disk, and CPU of a machine – can potentially af-
fect the performance of an algorithm. Suppose now that each
experiment takes about one day to run and there are 10 pos-
sible types of memory, 10 types of disks, and 10 types of
CPUs to be tested. Running an experiment with all possi-
bilities would take 10 × 10 × 10 = 1, 000 days. Instead
of running all possibilities, a 2k design would consider two
Factor −1 +1
Gender (G) Female Male
Activity Level (A) Low activity High activity
Posting Method (P) Repost Repost+Markov
Table 3: Factors used in the factorial experiment for the
socialbot infiltration study.
(usually extreme) types of memory, two types of disk, and
two types of CPUs to compare, which would result in only
23 = 8 days of experiments. The theory of factorial experi-
ments [20] would then allow one to estimate how much each
factor impacts on the final result, a key information to help
decide on which factors an experiment should focus.
Note that, differently of the above example, our goal here
is not primarily to reduce the number of experiment scenar-
ios. Instead we use a 2k design to infer how much a factor
– which, in our case, correspond to attributes like gender,
activity level, and posting method – impacts the different in-
filtration metrics.
7.2 Factorial experiment on the socialbot in-
filtration
For certain applications, the objective of socialbots might
be to infiltrate a particular target group of users. Hence, we
here individually consider the success of our socialbots in
infiltrating each of the three target groups (which were de-
scribed in Section 3). For each target group, we consider
the three infiltration metrics stated earlier – the number of
followers acquired, the number of message-based interac-
tions and the Klout score. Then, for each metric and each
target group, we executed a 23 design considering the at-
tributes and their values as described in Table 3, resulting
in 3 × 3 × 23 = 216 experiments. We performed experi-
ments that associates +1 or −1 for the strategies employed
for each attribute. All experimental configurations for all
datasets were averaged over 5 results, which is the number
of socialbots in each configuration.
The basic idea of the factorial design model consists of
formulating y, the infiltration impact, as a function of a num-
ber of factors and their possible combinations, as defined by
Equation 1. Here, GP, AP, AG, and GAP account for all
possible combinations among the factors. For instance, the
experiments for ‘GP’ attempts to measure the impact of a
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certain combination of the attributes Gender (G) and Post-
ing method (P) (e.g., ‘Female and Repost’, or ‘Male and Re-
post+Markov’).
y = Q0 +
∑
i∈F
Qi · xi (1)
where F = {G,A, P,GA,GP,AP,GAP} and xi is
defined as follows.
xG =
{
-1 if Female
+1 if Male
xA =
{
-1 if Low activity
+1 if High activity
xP =
{
-1 if Repost
+1 if Repost + Markov
and the xi’s for the feature-combinations (e.g., AG, GP) are
defined from the values of xG, xA, and xP following the
standard way described in [20] (details omitted for brevity).
In the above equation, Qi is the infiltration performance
(according to a certain metric like number of followers, or
Klout score) when strategy i ∈ F is applied, and Q0 stands
for the average infiltration performance, averaged over all
possible features and their combinations. By empirically
measuring y according to different feature-combinations
(which, in our case, refer to the various socialbot strategies),
we can estimate the values of the different Qi and Q0. This
allows us to understand by how much each factor impacts
the final infiltration performance.
Instead of presenting results for all possible values of Qi,
we focus on the variations of Qi due to changes in the
features (or their combinations), which helps to estimate
the importance of a particular factor to the final result. As
an example, if we find that a factor accounts for only 1% of
total variation on the results, we can infer that this attribute
is unimportant for infiltrating Twitter with a socialbot.
As proposed in [20], the importance of the various factors
can be quantitatively estimated by assessing the proportion
of the total variation in the final result that is explained
by each factor. To compute this variation, we first consider
the variation of y (as defined by Equation 1) across all runs,
and then compute SST as the sum of the squared difference
between each measured value of y and the mean value of y.
Then, we compute SSi as the variation only due to the
changes on factor i, which can be computed similarly to
SST , but considering only those runs in which the values of
the factor i were changed. Finally, we calculate the fraction
of variation due to factor i as SSiSST . We now use this metric to
compute the impact of each attribute for different infiltration
metrics and groups of target users.
7.3 Attribute Importance
We begin by analyzing to what extent each of the at-
tributes impacts the number of followers acquired by the
socialbots. Table 4 shows the variation explained by each
attribute in the number of followers acquired by the social-
bots from each of the target groups. We note that the ac-
tivity level of a socialbot is the most important attribute for
Group 1 (random users) of target users, being 53.75% re-
sponsible for deciding the number of followers acquired by a
socialbot. The second most important attribute is the posting
method (i.e., technique used to generate the tweets), which
accounts for 12.44% of the variation on the number of fol-
lowers. The combination of these two attributes (AP column
in Table 4) leads to a high variation (about 20%) on the num-
ber of followers as well.
Similar observations can be made from Table 5 and Ta-
ble 6, which shows the percentage variation explained by
each attribute on the number of message-based interactions
(i.e., number of tweets retweeted or favorited, number of
mentions, and number of replies) and on the Klout Scores,
respectively.
We also observe that the importance of some of the at-
tributes varies significantly according to the group of users
targeted by the socialbots. For instance, the gender attribute
has a great importance in the experiments with target users
from Group 3, being responsible for 20.52% of the varia-
tion of the number of followers (Table 4) and 12.71% of the
message-based interactions (Table 5) when the target users
are from this group.9 However, the gender attribute does not
seem to have much influence on the other target groups. This
suggests that the gender of the socialbots can make a differ-
ence if the target users are gender-biased, or susceptible to
follow and interact with users of a certain gender.
8. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
In this work, we exposed Twitter’s vulnerability against
large-scale socialbot attacks that can affect both Twitter it-
self and services built on crowd-sourced data gathered from
Twitter. This problem is a clear adversarial fight, or as usu-
ally called, a cat and mouse fight. We put ourselves in the
mouse’s shoes (i.e., assumed the perspective of socialbot-
developers) as an attempt to bring to the research community
a novel perspective to the problem. We analyzed the impor-
tance of various attributes in deciding the infiltration per-
formance of socialbots, and designed a 2k factorial design
experiment in order to quantify the extent to which different
socialbot strategies impact their infiltration performance.
We believe that our findings have a number of implica-
tions for designers of spam defense mechanisms in OSNs.
First, we demonstrated that it is possible to infiltrate Twitter
with simple automated strategies – this calls for better de-
fense mechanisms than those that are currently deployed on
Twitter. We also show that existing influence metrics such
as Klout are vulnerable to socialbot strategies. Second, ma-
licious activities have different nuances in the Twitter plat-
form, including Sybil attacks [39], link-farming [13], con-
tent pollution [25], content credibility [5], search SPAM [2],
phishing [7], and so on. Socialbots may be used to per-
form any of these forms of attacks; moreover, their strate-
9We found that the users in Group 3 were more likely to
follow and interact with socialbots having female profiles.
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Gender (G) Activity level (A) Posting method (P) GA GP AP GAP
Group 1 7.43 53.75 12.44 5.20 0.85 20.10 0.23
Group 2 3.99 72.65 2.77 4.38 3.53 2.81 9.87
Group 3 20.52 49.27 2.02 2.40 5.42 12.71 7.66
Table 4: Percentage variation in the number of followers explained by each kind of attribute
Gender (G) Activity level (A) Posting method (P) GA GP AP GAP
Group 1 0.03 36.58 13.87 0.31 2.83 44.74 1.64
Group 2 0.00 40.56 7.26 20.67 19.39 6.34 5.77
Group 3 12.71 43.23 4.51 19.60 8.18 1.19 10.58
Table 5: Percentage variation in the number of message-based interactions explained by each
kind of attribute
Gender (G) Activity level (A) Posting method (P) GA GP AP GAP
Group 1 0.46 41.32 21.69 0.00 0.61 35.90 0.02
Group 2 7.58 31.98 12.62 15.93 15.93 10.19 5.78
Group 3 12.58 31.42 17.92 12.94 12.37 2.13 10.65
Table 6: Percentage variation in the Klout score explained by each kind of attribute
gies might change depending on the particular set of users
they want to infiltrate or influence. Hence, our efforts to-
wards understanding the best socialbot strategies may sug-
gest improvements for different defense mechanisms de-
signed to counter specific types of malicious activities in
Twitter. Third, our study suggests some limitations of ex-
isting mechanisms for detection of bots / fake accounts, and
potential ways to improve them:
(i) We find that re-posting others’ tweets is a simple but
promising strategy for socialbots, especially considering that
existing Twitter defenses could not detect most of the bots
employing this strategy. This suggests that those accounts
for which a large fraction of tweets are re-posts / retweets
can be monitored.
(ii) We see that Twitter users, in general, are not good at
distinguishing tweets posted by real users and tweets gener-
ated automatically using statistical models. This implies that
relying on user-generated reports for identifying bots / fake
accounts (as done by Twitter [38]) may not be a promising
approach. Rather, approaches that investigate the linguistic
aspects of tweets could be explored to identify automatically
generated tweets.
(iii) It is, in a way, comforting to note that, in order to achieve
high infiltration success in a short time, socialbot accounts
need to be highly active, e.g., they need to post tweets and
follow users almost every hour. This implies that it might
be sufficient to monitor those accounts which are regularly
active, in order to prevent bots from becoming influential.
As future work, we note that most socialbot attacks ul-
timately aim to manipulate public opinion about political
candidates, themes or products. Although there exists evi-
dence of opinion change [27, 35], it is still unclear whether,
or to what extent, socialbots can influence people’s decisions
about products, brands, or political candidates. This is an
open research topic that we plan to investigate in future.
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